U.S. Presidential Race 2028, Marco Rubio or J.D. Vance. The View From Rome

Should Italian stakeholders support Secretary of State Marco Rubio or Vice President J.D. Vance in a possible 2028 White House Bid?

The answer appears relatively straightforward, at least if the issue is assessed exclusively through the prism of Italian national interests. It makes little sense for Italians to judge the two prospective candidates on ideological grounds and conclude that the one whose domestic agenda most closely reflects their own political preferences should be preferred. Any future US presidential candidate will naturally have positions on taxation, regulation, welfare, immigration, and social policy, but those programmes are designed primarily to affect American citizens and businesses. What matters to Italy is not US domestic policy but the candidates' respective approaches to foreign policy, international security, international trade, and strategic economic relations.

European Security Requires a Credible American Commitment

From a security standpoint, the European Union, despite the comparatively balanced position adopted by the Italian government, has increasingly reflected the strategic preferences of Germany and France. Both countries have sought to compensate for the decline of their automotive industries, accelerated by the EU's Green Deal, through a greater emphasis on defence manufacturing. The result has been a significant European rearmament effort, accompanied by political and media narratives portraying Russia as an imminent military threat. Whether justified or not, this climate has contributed to a marked deterioration in relations with Moscow and has increased the risk of confrontation with the world's largest nuclear power.

President Trump has consistently advocated a more conciliatory approach towards Russia. The European Commission and the European Council, however—driven largely by Germany and France, with active encouragement from the United Kingdom, which has traditionally opposed any continental geopolitical equilibrium based on close German-Russian economic integration—have chosen a different course. Continued European support for Ukraine, itself driven as much by economic considerations as by geopolitical ones, no longer enjoys the unequivocal backing in Washington that it did under the Biden administration.

This has produced a situation that is particularly unfavourable for Italy. The European Union has adopted an increasingly confrontational posture towards Moscow, while the Trump administration has shown little willingness to provide unconditional support for such an approach. Until recently, Russia had little strategic incentive to confront Western Europe directly beyond the Ukrainian theatre. Yet a substantial European rearmament programme, combined with increasingly assertive rhetoric, particularly from Germany, could eventually alter Moscow's strategic calculations and encourage consideration of preventive military measures. The recent statements by Russia's Foreign Minister indicating that negotiations with European governments over Ukraine have effectively ended illustrate the worsening state of relations. NATO's collective defence guarantees undoubtedly remain a powerful deterrent, but the possibility of escalation resulting from a military incident, miscalculation, or actions by Ukraine or individual European states cannot be dismissed.

In such an environment, the election in 2028 of a US president inclined towards a more assertive foreign policy, such as Marco Rubio, would arguably reinforce deterrence and reduce the likelihood of military conflict on European soil. Compared with a more restrained and comparatively non-interventionist approach associated with J.D. Vance, a Rubio presidency could help restore the strategic equilibrium that prevailed during much of the Cold War, when sustained American engagement contributed to preventing direct conflict between the Eastern and Western blocs despite far greater ideological hostility than exists today.

American Isolationism Would Also Carry Economic Costs for Italy

The economic dimension points in the same direction. J.D. Vance has consistently advocated reshoring manufacturing, repatriating capital, and strengthening domestic production under an America First industrial strategy. Such an approach would probably reduce incentives for American companies and investors to allocate capital to Italy while encouraging policies that favour domestic production over imports, including Italian exports.

Vance is also closely associated with influential Silicon Valley circles whose commercial relationship with Italy is primarily based on access to Italian markets rather than long-term productive investment within the country.

Marco Rubio, by contrast, has traditionally maintained stronger ties with financial and business communities whose interests are more naturally aligned with international investment. Rubio appears more committed to economic diplomacy and has repeatedly argued that American supply chains should, wherever possible, incorporate companies from allied Western countries rather than rely exclusively on domestic production.

The practical implications for Italy are significant. Under a Vance presidency, Italian firms might increasingly find themselves investing in the United States while facing a less favourable environment for exporting to the American market. Under a Rubio administration, the opposite dynamic would appear more likely: greater opportunities for American investment in Italy alongside a more open attitude towards economic integration with trusted allies. From the standpoint of Italian national interests, this would represent a more advantageous outcome.

The Question of Digital Sovereignty

Digital sovereignty provides another important point of comparison. Given J.D. Vance's close relationship with Palantir and other major technology interests, his administration could be expected to adopt a more assertive position in encouraging, or requiring, allied countries to rely on American digital infrastructure and critical technologies, including in highly sensitive sectors.

Marco Rubio would likely approach this issue more pragmatically. While remaining committed to close technological cooperation between allies, he would probably leave greater room for negotiated arrangements that better accommodate Italian interests in strategic autonomy and the governance of critical digital infrastructure.

Conclusion

Personal ideological preferences may lead some observers to identify more closely with either the neoconservative tradition represented by Marco Rubio or the MAGA nationalism associated with J.D. Vance. From the standpoint of Italian national interests, however, the calculation is rather different. On questions of European security, transatlantic economic relations, foreign investment, and digital sovereignty, a Marco Rubio presidency in 2028 would, on balance, appear more likely to serve Italy's strategic and economic interests than a presidency led by J.D. Vance.

Mark Bosshard is member of Italia Atlantica's Scientific Committee. He is professor of commercial and IP law at University of Parma as well as barrister admitted to the Italian Senior Courts.

Photo: Vice President J.D. Vance swears in Marco Rubio - By Office of Vice President of the United States - https://twitter.com/VP/status/1881759016529072615, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=158319804